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GENDER JUSTICE WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 
Marion Smiley* 
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM. Edited by Linda J. Nicholson. New 
York: Routledge. 1990. Pp. ix, 348. Cloth, $45; paper, $14.95. 
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE. By Iris Marion Young. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 286. Cloth, 
$39.50; paper, $12.95. 
The term postmodernism was once used very carefully to refer to 
the rejection of modernist sensibilities in the field of architecture. To-
day, however, a variety of academics employ the term more loosely to 
signal their own movement beyond accepted doctrine in whatever dis-
cipline they happen to represent. Hence, we should not be surprised 
to discover that many of the books that now call themselves 
postmodernist do not teach us anything new about either modernism 
or what might come after it. Two important exceptions are Linda 
Nicholson's Feminism/Postmodemism and Iris Young's Justice and 
the Politics of Difference. 
Both books are valuable in their own right and go beyond most 
other works on postmodernism in two important respects. First, un-
like those studies that use the term postmodernism to connote mere 
newness or liberation from accepted doctrine, these books explore the 
nature of postmodernism in depth and articulate its relationship to 
modernism. Second, instead of treating postmodemism as a mere aca-
demic exercise, they take its practical aspects seriously and ask, "What 
sorts of consequences might we expect to follow from the incorpora-
tion of postmodernism into social and political practice?" 
Feminism/Postmodemism is a collection of intelligent and lively 
essays organized around the potential value of postmodernism to the 
women's movement. Many of the essays are by prominent feminist 
philosophers and were originally published in different contexts. But 
they all focus in their own way on what would happen to the women's 
movement if it were to leave behind its universal principles of justice 
and focus on the cultural differences that exist among particular wo-
men. Unlike more purely partisan efforts, the volume does not speak 
in one voice or put forth one feminist political vision. Instead, it 
brings together conflicting opinions about what feminists might gain 
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison. B.A., M.A. 
1976, Mount Holyoke College; Ph.D. 1984, Princeton University. - Ed. 
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- or lose - from replacing universal principles of justice with a more 
pluralistic account of women in contemporary society. 
Justice and the Politics of Difference is an original theory of justice 
based loosely on postmodernism and its insistence on talcing various 
cultural, racial, and gender differences seriously. The first part of the 
book focuses on what is wrong with modem theories of justice that 
assume universal principles of truth and a neutral point of view. The 
second part of the book develops a group-based theory of justice and 
draws out its policy implications in areas as diverse as urban planning, 
law, national representation, feminist politics, and distributive justice. 
Since both books purport to be concerned about the practical im-
plications of postmodernism, they are ideally suited to a discussion of 
how postmodernism might be incorporated into political theory and 
practice. I suggest below that while both works go far in sketching the 
contours of a postmodern politics, each in its own way is held back by 
the philosophical tendencies of earlier postmodernists. Hence, they to-
gether constitute an important starting point for those who want to 
talk about postmodernism as a radical political theory, but they do not 
fully develop the political aspects of postmodemism itself. 
Not surprisingly, their definition of postmodernism turns out to be 
of utmost importance in this context. Since both Nicholson and 
Young clearly wish to incorporate postmodernism into social and 
political practice, they might have developed a political definition of 
postmodemism itself by, say, including a set of distinctly 
postmodernist institutions or political points of view. Likewise, since 
they are both critical of the status quo, they might have included in 
their definition of postmodernism the sorts of values that would enable 
them to criticize the status quo as postmodernists. But they do not do 
so. Instead, they fall back on the standard philosophical definition of 
postmodemism as the rejection of universal truths, transcendental val-
ues, and neutral conceptions of justice. 
Nicholson and her coauthor, Nancy Fraser, as feminists, want to 
go beyond other postmodernists in combining their rejection of 
foundationalism with the "robust conceptions of social criticism" that 
feminists offer (p. 20). But they do not develop a "robust conception" 
of postmodernism itself. Young identifies herself as a postmodernist 
and draws out the implications of postmodernism for various public 
policies. But she chooses not to involve herself in metatheoretical 
questions because, she says, "[w]hen social theorists and social critics 
focus on such epistemological questions, they often abstract from the 
social issues [about which they were originally concerned]" (p. 8). 
Hence, although she, like Nicholson and Fraser, takes postmodemism 
into the realm of politics, she does not alter the understanding of 
postmodemism that she inherits from her philosophical mentors. 
Rather, she retains a sense of postmodernism as the rejection of those 
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claims to universality and neutrality associated with Enlightenment 
thinking. 
Since these theorists do not develop a political definition of 
postmodernism, they find it necessary to combine postmodernism with 
other critical social and political theories. Nicholson and Fraser de-
velop what they call a "postmodernist feminism" (p. 34) by merging 
their postmodernist rejection of foundationalism with the critical per-
spectives of the women's movement. Young tries to establish a series 
of public policies that avoid the universal principles of modernism and 
capture the postmodern respect for cultural differences by developing 
a theory of justice based on the expression of group perspectives. The 
ultimate question for these authors becomes how they can possibly 
merge their rejections of philosophical foundationalism with a more 
positive theory of social and political change. The answer, I suggest 
below, lies in their ability to replace universal principles of justice with 
the practical criteria of their own radical politics, or, in other words, 
to develop generalizations about women and other oppressed groups 
on the basis of their own experiences, rather than on the basis of uni-
versal truths. 
Nicholson, in her introduction, claims to take the practical criteria 
of her own radical politics very seriously and admonishes other schol-
ars for not recognizing the politics behind their own analytic catego-
ries. "[C]onceptual distinctions, criteria of legitimation, cognitive 
procedural rules, and so forth are all political and therefore represent 
moves of power ... " (p. 11). But she does not, as her admonishments 
might lead us to expect, begin her analysis by revealing where she 
stands politically as a feminist. Instead, she begins by exploring two 
beliefs which, she argues, guide all modem Western scholars in their 
pursuit of truth. One of these beliefs is that the sort of knowledge 
worth pursuing is that which reveals the universal truths of natural 
and social reality. The other is that true knowledge is that which rep-
licates a "God's eye view" of the world, rather than the perspectives of 
a particular individual or group (p. 2). 
Both beliefs persist, according to Nicholson, throughout the acad-
emy. But they are especially important to the discipline of philosophy, 
because philosophers not only assume, but depend for their very aca-
demic existence on, the possibility of a truth that transcends history. 
Not surprisingly, the search for such a truth takes on different forms, 
depending on the subject matter in question. If the subject matter is 
art, Nicholson notes, philosophers ask, "What is the beautiful?" If it 
is ethics, the discussion centers on "the good" or "the right." If it is 
jurisprudence, we will be cajoled into asking, "What is law?"; and if it 
is politics, we will be presented with a number of possible projects that 
require us either to discover human nature or to establish universal 
principles of justice. 
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Nicholson argues, along with a variety of other postmodernists, 1 
that principles such as these, which try to locate essences, are unac-
ceptable for three general reasons. First, they presuppose an objectiv-
ity which, according to Nicholson, is simply impossible. Second, 
universal principles of truth are not only nonneutral, but also reflect 
the perspectives of particular groups who are, in most cases, able to 
exercise more power than others in society. Third, such principles 
privilege powerful groups over others because the ostensibly universal 
truths on which they are based are determined by the culture of the 
powerful. In sum, modem philosophy is, according to Nicholson, 
both philosophically naive and a form of political domination (pp. 2-
4). 
Nicholson's view of modem philosophy as political domination 
might appear to elevate philosophy beyond its actual importance in 
contemporary society. But philosophical conceptions and assertions 
are frequently incorporated into more purely social and political argu-
ments in ways that lead to the exclusion of the least powerful in soci-
ety. Nicholson does not identify particular arguments herself, but she 
could easily have focused on the recent efforts by liberal political theo-
rists to discern the principles of justice that purely rational individuals 
would choose.2 Because these efforts construe rationality as a tran-
scendental, ahistorical quality characteristic of all human beings, they 
are able to present their principles of justice as universal. But the no-
tion of a transcendental self is itself historically determined, and not 
even shared by all members of our own community. Hence, those who 
invoke it not only impose a particular cultural identity on individuals, 
but exclude from consideration the experiences of those whose identi-
ties are self-consciously culturally specific. · 
Liberal political theory's explicit reliance on principles of neutral-
ity and universality makes it the frequent target of postmodern criti-
ques. But liberal theory is not alone in its imposition of false essences 
on individuals, nor is it the most oppressive. Marxist theory purports 
to take history seriously, but it assumes, a priori, the universal primacy 
of economics; it identifies individuals solely with reference to a univer-
1. The two most prominent postmodernists writing today are Jean-Fran~is Lyotard and 
Richard Rorty. Lyotard articulates the contours of his theory in J. LYOTARD, THE 
POSTMODERN CoNDmON (1984), and J. LYOTARD & J. THE.BAUD, JUST GAMING (1985). 
Rorty develops his postmodernism in both R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NA-
TURE (1979), and R. RORTY, CoNSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982). Rorty draws out the 
political implications of postmodernism in R. RORTY, CoNTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 
(1989); Rorty, Habermas and Lyotard on Post-modernity, 4 PRAXIS INTL. 32 (1984); Rorty, 
Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583 (1983); Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to 
Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257 (M. Peterson & R. 
Vaughan eds. 1988); Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity? in POST-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 3 (J. 
Rajchman & C. West eds. 1985). 
2. The most influential of these theories is that of John Rawls. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971). 
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sal system of class conflict; and it couches the political aims of a par-
ticular revolutionary party in terms of universal, objective, scientific 
laws of history. Such laws are not, according to Nicholson, really ob-
jective, but the reflection of a particular point of view in history, and 
they cannot possibly be imposed on individuals without domination. 
Nor can they be reformulated in a more universalist vein without re-
producing such domination in practice.3 
Much of contemporary feminist thought fares no better. Nichol-
son (writing with coauthor Nancy Fraser in "Social Criticism Without 
Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism" 
(pp. 19-38)) argues that although contemporary feminist theories are 
generally more sensitive than are other theories to the particular con-
texts in which individuals find themselves, they frequently fall back on 
essentialist claims about the nature of women or the universal oppres-
sion that women experience as women. Examples of such feminist es-
sentialism are not difficult to locate. As Nicholson herself points out, 
they can be found in liberal feminist claims about the equal abilities of 
men and women,4 in the radical feminist categories of sex-class,5 and 
in the cultural feminist's focus on "woman's culture."6 
Each of these feminist theories attempts to be all-inclusive, but 
they all necessarily exclude particular women by virtue of the univer-
salist claims that they make. Liberal feminists may have good political 
reasons to push for gender equality under law, but by doing so, they 
obscure important differences between and among men and women -
differences that need to be addressed before any talk of real equality is 
possible. Radical feminists may see a practical need to talk about wo-
men together as a "sex class," but by relying on such a classification 
and locating the source of all women's oppression in patriarchy, they 
necessarily distort the experiences of those women who, for example, 
take their racial or cultural identity as primary. Cultural feminists fall 
into the same trap by virtue of their universal talk about womanhood. 
Nicholson and Fraser's remedy to the universalism trap is to bring 
feminism and postmodernism together into a "postmodernist femi-
nism." "[T]he ultimate stake of an encounter between feminism and 
postmodernism is the prospect of a perspective which integrates their 
3. Nicholson develops her arguments about Marxism more fully in L. NICHOLSON, GENDER 
AND HlsTORY: THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL THEORY IN THE AGE OF THE FAMILY (1986). 
4. The range of liberal feminism is of course vast. For an excellent discussion of liberal 
feminism as a distinct category, see Jaggar, Political Philosophies of Women's Liberation, in FEM· 
INISM AND PHILOSOPHY 5 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1977). 
5. The sex-class analysis mentioned here is not infrequently associated with S. FIRESTONE, 
THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970). In recent years, it has been appropriated by a variety of radical 
feminist historians. See, e.g., G. LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986). 
6. Such a focus is most pronounced in the works of Mary Daly. In particular, see M. DALY 
GYN/EcOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1978). For an excellent discussion 
of the women-centered analysis in general, see H. EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST 
THOUGHT 139-45 (1983). 
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respective strengths while eliminating their respective weaknesses. It 
is the prospect of a postmodernist feminism" (p. 20). 
In their essay, Nicholson and Fraser begin with the "respective 
strengths" of both postmodernism and feminism, rather than with the 
needs of the women's movement itself. Presumably they feel comfort-
able in doing so because they view postmodernist feminism not as a set 
of political practices but as a methodological antidote to modem social 
and political theory. Postmodernist feminism breaks down the legiti-
macy of universal truth claims and the interpretative criteria on which 
these claims are based. Unlike modem social and political theory, 
postmodernism rejects essentialist claims about human nature and 
transhistorical ideals of justice. Unlike earlier historicist claims about 
the inevitable "situatedness" of human thought - claims which, ac-
cording to Nicholson and Fraser, provide a very weak counter to the 
norm of objectivity - postmodernism challenges the objectivity of 
truth itself and claims that the very weak criteria dividing the true and 
false, science and myth, fact and superstition, are internal to the tradi-
tions of modernity and represent the growth and development of spe-
cific "regimes of power." 
Postmodernism, construed as such, focuses on the forms of power 
that exist in our methodological standards, extends the fields in which 
power is thought to operate, and critically analyzes in terms of domi-
nation the various universal identities now associated with modernism. 
Nicholson and Fraser contend that postmodernism, construed as such, 
is important to feminism both because it breaks down male epistemo-
logical privilege in political discourse and because it ensures that a 
plurality of women's voices - and not just those of upper middle-class 
white women -will be heard within the feminist movement itself.7 
But, they worry, postmodernism as now construed does not enable 
social and political change, since, in the hands of postmodernists such 
as Francois Lyotard, Richard Rorty, and others, it rejects large scale 
narratives about both injustice and the oppression of individuals who 
are oppressed by virtue of their group membership. Both Nicholson 
and Fraser assume that if postmodernism is to be incorporated into a 
critical social and political theory, it will have to develop large scale 
narratives about oppression and become capable of sustaining a focus 
on economic and political institutions. Although they do not specify 
the particular narratives and institutional foci that they have in mind, 
they do make two more general points. First, if postmodern feminists 
do not develop large scale narratives about oppression, they will be 
unable to talk about women together as an oppressed group. Second, 
7. Bell hooks develops a series of arguments throughout her works about how black women 
have been excluded from much of mainstream feminism as a result of the stamp that white upper 
middle-class women have placed on their feminist analyses. See her arguments in B. HOOKS, 
AIN'T I A WOMAN? (1981); B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); 
and B. HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL PoLmcs (1990). 
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if feminists do not incorporate an institutional analysis into their an-
tifoundationalist world view, they will not be able to assist social and 
political movements whose goals are practical. 
Nicholson and Fraser specify that the theory they envision would 
be explicitly historical and attuned to the cultural specificity of differ-
ent societies, periods, and groups. Likewise, it would be "inflected by 
temporality, with historically specific institutional categories like the 
modern, restricted, male-headed nuclear family taking precedence 
over ahistorical, functionalist categories like reproduction and mother-
ing" {p. 34). And finally, such a theory would dispense with the idea 
of a subject in history - a move which would replace unitary notions 
of woman and feminine gender identity with "plural and complexly 
constructed conceptions of social identity, treating gender as one rele-
vant strand among others, attending also to class, race, ethnicity, age, 
and sexual orientation" {pp. 34-35). 
Nicholson and Fraser present their prescriptions clearly and 
straightforwardly. But they omit several important steps in their ef-
fort to present postmodernism as a critical social and political theory. 
In particular, they do not detail how an insistence on historical speci-
ficity will enable feminists to develop large scale narratives or talk 
about the oppression of groups in society. Both theorists clearly want 
to rely on the group orientation and critical perspectives of feminist 
theory to provide a basis for these large-scale narratives and institu-
tional analyses. But they do not say how such large-scale narratives 
and institutional analyses are possible within the confines of 
postmodernist theory, which construes both its evaluative criteria and 
its understanding of identity historically. Instead, they simply assume 
that they can "integrate[] [the] respective strengths [of both theories] 
while eliminating their respective weaknesses" {p. 20). 
Such a merger simply may not be possible if, as critics suggest, 
feminism derives its critical strength from universal principles of jus-
tice or human nature. 8 Clearly, there are many theorists who contend 
that the category of oppression requires a transhistorical conception of 
human nature both to identify oppression in particular cases and to 
construe such oppression as wrong.9 While such a contention is not 
necessarily correct, it does suggest that postmodern feminists such as 
Nicholson and Fraser will have to do more than simply tack the vir-
tues of feminism onto postmodernism. 
In particular, they will have to accomplish two much more difficult 
tasks. First, they will have to develop a method for discussing gender 
relations as oppressive without invoking universal principles of justice 
8. For an excellent analysis of these arguments, see A. JAGGAR, FEMINlsr POLITICS AND 
HUMAN NATURE (1983). 
9. A vibrant debate surrounds this issue among Marxists and their critics. For an analysis of 
the debate itself, see J. ELSrER, MAKING SENSE OF MARx 220-41 (1985). 
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or human nature. Second, they will have to show how they can talk 
about women as a group without falling back on universal claims 
about a woman's identity. Because they do not do either of these 
things, they leave unanswered a variety of questions that skeptics 
might pose about the practical implications of postmodemism for 
political movements such as feminism. How, skeptics might ask, can 
postmodemists view women as a group once they replace the universal 
identities of modernism with a focus on the particular? How can they 
characterize particular institutions as unjust once they ground the 
concept of justice itself in social and political practice, rather than in a 
set of external evaluative criteria? How, finally, can they expect wo-
men to exercise control over their own lives - a stated goal of femi-
nism - once they relinquish the concept of subjectivity and treat 
women as constructions of history? 
Christine Di Stefano suggests in her contribution to the volume -
"Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodern-
ism" (pp. 63-82) - that postmodernism is a theory whose time may 
have come for men, but not for women. Since men have had their 
Enlightenment, she argues, they can afford a decentered self and 
humility regarding the coherence and truth of the:tir claims. But if wo-
men were to decenter their selves, they might weaken what is not yet 
strong. Likewise, if they were to forgo universals, they might jeopard-
ize alliances, a politics which is not only crucial to feminism, but 
which itself depends on a relatively unified notion of the social subject 
"woman." 
Seyla Benhabib focuses in "Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A 
Rejoinder to Jean-Frangois Lyotard" (pp. 107 -30) on the relativism of 
postmodernism and its implications for feminism and other critical so-
cial and political theories. While she agrees with the postmodern cri-
tique of essentialism, she can be read as arguing that the sort of 
relativism embraced by Lyotard, among others, leaves only a choice 
between two undesirable alternatives. On the one hand, if we accept a 
"polytheism of values" (p. 113), we cannot talk about justice or coher-
ently criticize the status quo. On the other hand, if we do not accept 
such a "polytheism of values," we are forced to "privilege[] 'one do-
main of discourse and knowledge over others as a hidden criterion" 
(p.113). 
While Benhabib worries that postmodernism will lead us down a 
relativist path, Nancy Hartsock (pp. 157-75) and Susan Bardo (pp. 
133-56) worry that it will destroy the category of gender itself, a cate-
gory that is absolutely crucial to feminism. If postmodernism requires 
abandoning cross-cultural categories, they ask, how can feminists gen-
eralize about women? And if feminists cannot generalize about wo-
men, are the only alternatives powerlessness or the politics of 
individual action? Both Hartsock and Bordo argue that all social the-
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orizing needs a stopping point and that the stopping point for f emi-
nists can only be gender (pp. 133-45, 157-60, 170-73). Likewise, each 
makes clear that if feminism invokes the ideal of endless difference, 
either self-destruction or meaningless abstract individualism will 
result. 
While the ideal of endless difference threatens all feminists, it espe-
cially threatens feminists who take law seriously, since law necessarily 
imposes on individuals a set of universal prescriptions. To be sure, 
some feminist legal scholars focus on difference per se in an effort to 
replace universalist claims in law with pluralist perspectives. But even 
these scholars acknowledge that without a universal adherence to law 
in general, differentiated legal treatment makes no sense in either the-
ory or practice.10 
Are postmodernists obliged to embrace an ideal of endless differ-
ence? Can they establish a stopping point in gender and acknowledge 
that any society which takes law seriously will have to accept general-
izations about the situations in which particular individuals find them-
selves? Presumably, if postmodernists want to establish such a 
stopping point and allow for generalizations about identity, they must 
forgo the security of philosophy and embrace the much messier world 
of politics, where social generalizations are already made uncon-
sciously on the basis of practical goals and structural limitations and 
where the stopping points about which Hartsock and Bordo worry are 
already the starting points of political argument. 
Are Nicholson and Fraser willing to replace philosophy with the 
practical criteria of their own political movement as a way of justifying 
their generalizations about women? Nicholson and Fraser perceive 
the dangers associated with a purely philosophical postmodernism. 
As Nicholson writes in her introduction to the book (pp. 1-16): "The 
clear danger here is in viewing postmodernism as merely an invocation 
of certain abstract ideals, such as 'difference' rather than viewing the 
postmodern invocation of difference as following from and being lim-
ited to the demands of specific political contexts" (p. 10). Likewise 
both theorists, in their contribution, attempt to develop a postmodern 
analysis feminists can use to pursue political empowerment. But be-
cause they define postmodernism philosophically (p. 19), rather than 
politically, they are not able to demonstrate on purely political 
grounds how feminists might develop generalizations about women 
which are liberating rather than oppressive. 
Presumably, if they were to begin with the practical concerns of 
the women's movement itself, they might be able to generalize from 
the situations of particular women and maintain a category of gender 
10. For one of the most comprehensive discussions of "difference" in the legal context, see 
M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 
(1990) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Allan C. Hutchinson - Ed.) 
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identity without invoking universal principles of human nature. Like-
wise, if they were to glean principles of justice not from philosophy, 
but from the claims that oppressed persons themselves make, they 
might be able to criticize the status quo as postmodernists. What 
might both projects entail? Iris Young provides a possible example in 
Justice and the Politics of Difference by placing the claims of various 
group-based social movements at the center of her prescriptions for 
justice. 
Young wants to develop a new way of thinking about justice in 
American society by shifting our attention away from considerations 
of neutrality to how various oppressed groups in society can be em-
powered. But she does not want to "construct a theory of justice" (p. 
3), since she believes that to do so would reintroduce the universal 
claims that she as a postmodernist eschews. Young's project is contex-
tualist and focused on the particular. She begins not with an idea of 
justice, but with a set of experiences shared by those who have been 
excluded from power in the United States - women, blacks, Ameri-
can Indians, gays, lesbians, and the poor. Likewise, instead of impos-
ing external moral standards on these experiences, she sets out "to 
express rigorously and reflectively some of the claims about justice and 
injustice implicit in the politics of these movements, and to explore 
their meaning and implications" (p. 7). 
Since most of the claims about justice and injustice that she ex-
plores involve domination and oppression, she focuses on domination 
and oppression in her conceptualization of justice itself. "[S]ocial jus-
tice means the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppres-
sion. Any aspect of social organization and practice relevant to 
domination and oppression is in principle subject to evaluation by ide-
als of justice" (p. 15). Presumably, her "ideals of justice" have some-
thing to do with freedom and self-expression, since freedom and self-
expression generally are considered the opposites of domination and 
oppression. But Young does not make such a claim herself. Instead, 
she explores the ideals of justice in terms of their "political" manifesta-
tions and contrasts them with more purely distributive models of 
justice. 
Young's understanding of "the political" includes virtually every 
form of behavior that we now recognize as political. "As I understand 
it," she writes, "the concept of justice coincides with the concept of 
the political. Politics ... includes all aspects of institutional organiza-
tion, public action, social practices and habits, and cultural meanings 
insofar as they potentially subject to collective evaluation and deci-
sion-making" (p. 34). 
Since her general concern is with the dominated and oppressed 
members of our community, she focuses on those forms of politics that 
empower "outsiders." Likewise, she concentrates on shifting our at-
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tention away from questions of material distribution to procedural is-
sues of participation in deliberation and decisionmaking. Justice 
ultimately becomes a matter of political voice. 
For a norm to be just, everyone who follows it must in principle have an 
effective voice in its consideration and be able to agree to it without coer-
cion. For a social condition to be just, it must enable all to meet their 
needs and exercise their freedom; thus justice requires that all be able to 
express their needs. [p. 34] 
Three things distinguish Young's conception of justice from other 
contemporary conceptions. First, it is, according to Young, much 
"wider" than the typical distributive model in that it "covers every-
thing political" (p. 34). Second, it has its source not in an abstract 
idea of rationality, but in the politics of a group of individuals who 
have, according to Young, been systematically excluded from power 
throughout American history. Third, it is not universalist, but is 
based on a recognition of difference among individuals and the need 
for what she calls "democratic cultural pluralism" (p. 163) or the 
"politics of group assertion" (p. 167). 
Since the definition of justice that she relies upon is essentially 
Hannah Pitkin's understanding of politics - " 'the activity through 
which relatively large and permanent groups of people determine what 
they will collectively do, settle how they will live together, and decide 
their future' " 11 - she feels comfortable talking about the contribu-
tions that new left social movements have made to an understanding 
of justice by "their continuing effort to politicize vast areas of institu-
tional, social, and cultural life in the face of forces of welfare state 
liberalism which operate to depoliticize public life" (p. 10). Many of 
these contributions concern the nature of disempowerment and how 
disempowerment has occurred as a consequence of the replacement of 
democracy with public policy formulation. Other new left contribu-
tions highlight the importance of cultural and gender differences to 
social justice. It is with regard to the latter group of contributions -
those pertaining to "difference" - that Young makes her most inter-
esting and original arguments. 
While her efforts are generally constructive, her initial discussion 
of difference is critical. She concentrates on showing how liberal theo-
ries of impartiality, which posit a unified and universal point of view, 
oppress some social groups in practice by allowing the particular ex-
periences and perspectives of privileged groups to parade as universal 
and by leading bureaucrats and experts to think that they can exercise 
their decisionmaking power in an impartial manner (pp. 18-33). Her 
arguments are persuasive and, to the extent that she extends them to 
11. P. 9 (quoting Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Public and Private, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343 
(1981)). 
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the idea of a "civic public,"12 original. She argues that while imparti-
ality is frequently associated with theories of distributive justice, it has 
its counterpart in the ideal of a "civic public," an ideal which, as uni-
versalist, has operated effectively to exclude from citizenship persons 
identified with the body and feeling rather than with rationality -
women, Jews, blacks, American Indians (pp. 96-121). 
Young argues that an inclusive conception of justice that takes 
domination and oppression seriously will do two things. First, it will 
posit a vision of a heterogeneous public that itself acknowledges and 
affirms group difference. Second, it will challenge the liberal ideal of 
liberation as the elimination of group difference and replace it with an 
ideal that affirms group difference and fosters the inclusion and partic-
ipation of all groups in public life (pp. 156-91). Young develops such 
an ideal herself by referring to contemporary legal debates about 
equality and difference in women's liberation, bilingual education, and 
American Indian rights. She argues that recognizing group rights is 
necessary to promote their full participation and that the fear of 
stigma now associated with differential treatment makes sense only if 
we understand difference as opposition - or, in other words, identify 
equality with sameness and difference with deviation or devaluation 
(pp. 168-72). 
How can we avoid identifying equality with sameness and differ-
ence with deviation or devaluation? What would it mean to use group 
rights in the interest of full participation? Young responds to both 
questions by developing a principle of political decisionmaking that 
encourages autonomous organization of groups within a public, a prin-
ciple that entails for her the establishment of procedures for ensuring 
that each group's voice is heard in the public through institutions of 
group representation. Since she is concerned about the disempowered 
groups in American society, she focuses on them in her discussions of 
group representation. Moreover, she claims that social group repre-
sentation is for oppressed groups only. Justice "calls for the specific 
representation only of oppressed or disadvantaged groups. Privileged 
groups are already represented, in the sense that their voice, experi-
ence, values and priorities are already heard and acted upon" (p. 187). 
Young makes clear in this context that by "group representation" 
she does not mean interest group liberalism, which for her rests on the 
conflation of interests, rather than on a shared identity. By group rep-
resentation, she means the representation of "social groups," those 
12. Young uses as her paradigm of the "civic public" Rousseau's political philosophy, which, 
according to her, not only posits the sovereign people as embodiments of "a universal point of 
view" which transcends particular interests and perspectives, but conceives of the "public realm 
as unified and homogenous." P. 109. Young characterizes the "civic public" in terms of such a 
transcendent ideal. "The civic public expresses the universal and impartial point of view of rea-
son, standing opposed to and expelling desire, sentiment, and the particularity of needs and inter-
ests." P. 108. 
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"collective[ s] of people who have affinity with one another because of a 
set of practices or way of life" (p. 186). How are these social groups to 
be represented? Young argues that the democratic public should pro-
vide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of 
those constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. 
Such group representation itself requires (i) institutional support 
for the organization of group members so that they can achieve "col-
lective empowerment" and a "reflective understanding" (p. 184) of 
their collective experiences and interests; (ii) "group analysis and 
group generation of policy proposals in institutionalized contexts 
,where decisionmakers are obliged to show that their deliberations have 
taken group perspectives into consideration" (p. 184); and (iii) "group 
veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly, such 
as reproductive rights policy for women, or land use policy for Indian 
reservations" (p.184). 
In this context, Young argues that present affirmative action poli-
cies place too much emphasis on distribution, and not enough on par-
ticipation. She nevertheless supports these policies on the grounds 
that they are an important means for undermining oppression, espe-
cially oppression that results from unconscious stereotyping and pre-
sumptions about the neutrality of the privileged point of view (p. 192-
221). Moreover, while she concedes that rights can be dangerous to 
the spirit of a community, they are necessary - in the form of "group 
rights" - to empower those individuals whose very existence depends 
on the assertion of a group identity. 
While much of Young's analysis concerns group rights and group 
identities, her discussion of the idea of community is one of her most 
original contributions to the understanding of difference and inequal-
ity. Unlike other left political theorists who frequently value the ideal 
of community above all else, 13 Young argues that the ideal of commu-
nity suppresses differences, since the impulse to community often coin-
cides with a desire to preserve identity and, in practice, excludes those 
who threaten that sense of identity. She develops an alternative ideal 
of social relations and politics which begins from a "positive experi-
ence of city life" (p. 12-13), an experience that ideally embodies four 
virtues that represent heterogeneity rather than unity: social differen-
tiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. She argues 
that instead of increasing local autonomy in the way that many demo-
cratic theorists now suggest, a move which would only produce more 
privilege and domination, we should develop a form of metropolitan 
regional government founded in representative institutions that begin 
in neighborhood assemblies (pp. 226-56). 
Young's efforts to translate the political principle of difference into 
13. The two most widely cited recent communitarian works are B. BARBER, STRONG DE· 
MOCRACY (1984), and M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
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practical recommendations for city life, like her discussions of affirma-
tive action, bilingual education, and other policies of democratic cul-
tural pluralism, are not only extremely interesting and refreshingly 
original, but largely successful. They illuminate the concrete condi-
tions under which the postmodernist emphasis on difference can be 
translated into social and political practice. Although she does not 
develop a political theory of postmodernism, she goes beyond most 
other postmodernists by recognizing that our present theory of same-
ness and difference is itself political and that to transcend universality 
and to develop a concrete respect for cultural, gender and racial differ-
ences, we will have to start with the criteria of partisan politics, rather 
than with philosophy. 
But what about the postmodern principle of difference itself and 
the conception of justice that Young builds around it? Three ques-
tions need to be addressed. First, how can democratic cultural plural-
ism be sustained without the very differences that Young lauds 
creating unequal shares of power in society? Second, how can her par-
ticular conception of justice avoid reintroducing essentialist concep-
tions of human nature? Third, what sorts of political arguments, if 
any, can be made about democratic cultural pluralism to persuade 
others who do not begin with her own politics? 
Young's notion of democratic cultural pluralism is problematic in 
several respects. First, it is not clear what group representation of the 
oppressed and not of "the privileged" means. Who are the privileged 
and who are the oppressed? Young provides an excellent set of argu-
ments in "Five Faces of Oppression" (pp. 39-65) for discerning when 
oppression has occurred. But the criteria of oppression that she 
provides - exploitation, marginalization, cultural imperialism, 
powerlessness, and violence - may not be interpreted similarly by all 
members of the community. Moreover, without an interpretive con-
sensus, Young's entire system of justice is on shaky ground. 
Second, Young does not show how a system of justice can be par-
tially representative without those not represented dismantling the sys-
tem. Because those not represented in Young's system are "the 
privileged," we have to wonder about the power base upon which her 
system of justice will rest. While Young contends that "[p]rivileged 
groups are already represented, in the sense that their voice, experi-
ence, values, and priorities are already heard and acted upon" (p. 187), 
she does not consider the difficulties that will arise when informal rep-
resentation of the privileged confronts the more formal mechanisms of 
her own representative system. Nor does she confront the fact that 
many of "the privileged" will oppose those in need of formal represen-
tation and express their opposition to the system as a whole. 
Third, there may not be as much agreement as Young expects 
within particular oppressed groups, even with regard to the group's 
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own identity as a group. How much consensus does there need to be 
about what it means to be a woman or an African-American or a ho-
mosexual? If what is needed is a broad consensus and such a consen-
sus cannot be found, then Young's system of justice may not be as 
straightforwardly practical as she suggests. 
Fourth, a system based on difference might end up being based on 
inequality, given the unequal power bases of different groups. Young 
tries to resist the notion that difference is necessarily connected to ine-
quality. But she does not identify any safeguards against the devalua-
tion of particular groups on the basis of, for example, the racial or 
gender identities of their members. While she is correct that difference 
does not automatically translate into inequality (pp. 168-72), she is 
overly optimistic in assuming that the devaluation of particular groups 
will cease in her system of justice. 
The difficulties that I cite here are practical and might be overcome 
within Young's theoretical framework. But what about her theoretical 
framework itself? Young claims that her system of justice is based not 
on any foundational set of values or universal schema of justice, but 
rather on the claims that blacks, women, Hispanics, gays, and lesbians 
make. While this may be true, Young has organized these claims ac-
cording to her own categories of domination and oppression. Where, 
we have to ask, do these categories come from? Do they come from 
social and political practice or·from a more philosophical set of moral 
principles? Where, moreover, does the political principle of difference 
itself come from? Does it really derive from the needs that blacks, 
women, Hispanics, gays, and lesbians express, or does it have its 
source ill a theory of the good life which itself makes particular as-
sumptions about human nature? 
Young herself recognizes a potential dilemma here that faces all 
postmodernists who confront justice and injustice. 
Any normative theorist in the postmodern world is faced with a di-
lemma. On the one hand, we express and justify norms by appealing to 
certain values derived from a conception of the good human life. In 
some sense, then, any normative theory implicitly or explicitly relies on a 
conception of human nature. On the other hand, it would seem that we 
should reject the very idea of a human nature as misleading or oppres-
sive. [p. 36; citation omitted] 
Young tries to get around this dilemma by generating assumptions 
about human nature and the good life that are shared by all and ab-
stract enough not to be oppressive. In this context, she does not object 
to abstractness as potentially oppressive, although she did in the con-
text of her discussion of modernism. Instead, she touts abstractness as 
respectful to difference. "As long as the values we appeal to are ab-
stract enough, however, they will not devalue or exclude any particu-
lar culture or way of life" (p. 37). 
Young does not explain why her use of abstractness does not pres-
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ent us with the difficulties associated with modernism. Nor does she 
defend her use of the language of commonality. Instead, she spells out 
the values characterizing the good life, values that include the develop-
ment and exercise of one's capacities, the expression of one's exper-
iences, and participation in the determination of one's actions. Young 
concedes that "[t]hese are universalist values, in the sense that they 
assume the equal moral worth of all persons" (p. 37). She does not, 
however, seem to think that such universalism is problematic. 
But, she has already stipulated that universal values are problem-
atic, especially when they define human nature. "Any definition of a 
human nature is dangerous because it threatens to devalue or exclude 
some acceptable individual desires, cultural characteristics, or ways of 
life" (p. 36). Presumably Young thinks that she has captured what all 
human beings actually experience, as opposed to what other theorists 
think that they should experience. Her categories are nevertheless the-
oretically loaded. Moreover, such loadedness is not merely academic, 
since she defines both oppression and domination - the foci of justice 
- in terms of the values of a good life. 
Oppression consists in systematic institutional processes which pre-
vent some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills 
in socially recognized settings, or institutionalized social processes which 
inhibit people's ability to play and communicate with others or to ex-
press their feelings . . . . 
Domination consists in institutional conditions which inhibit or pre-
vent people from participating in determining their actions or the Condi-
tions of their actions. [p. 38] · 
While Young's definitions of oppression and domination may indeed 
express the concerns of women, blacks, Hispanics, and other groups 
excluded from power, they clearly are based on a set of theoretical 
assumptions, like "equal moral worth," which smack of essentialism. 
Young does not need to admit that she is being essentialist if she has 
gleaned her definitions from social and political practice. But she does 
need to recognize that many of our social and political practices are 
themselves informed by earlier Enlightenment ideals. Such ideals 
were at one time construed as essentialist. While they may now be 
construed as mere "practical norms," we have-to ask: Would they 
make sense in a postmodern world and, if not, how can 
postmodernists such as Young continue to rely on them? 
Because Young does not address the Enlightenment history of her 
own "political norms," she does not answer this question. Nor does 
she address the possibility that a postmodern outlook on the world 
may make it difficult to convince others to accept her system of justice. 
She concedes at the outset that, as a postmodernist, she cannot hope to 
generate arguments that all rational individuals should accept, but 
must rather be content with speaking from her own experiences to the 
experiences of others. 
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In pursuit of a systematic theory, much philosophical writing addresses 
an audience made up abstractly of all reasonable persons from the point 
of view of any reasonable person. Because I understand critical theory 
as starting from a specific location in a specific society, I can claim to be 
neither impartial nor comprehensive. [p. 13] 
Instead, she argues, she can claim only to speak about "assumptions 
that perhaps not all reasonable persons share" (p. 14). Because these 
assumptions include the assumptions "that basic equality in life situa-
tion for all persons is a moral value; that there are deep injustices in 
our society that can be rectified only by basic institutional changes"; 
and "that structures of domination wrongfully pervade our society" 
(p. 14), it is not clear whether Young will be able to convince those not 
within or sympathetic to the disempowered groups for which she 
claims to speak. 
Although the number of people who are part of or sympathetic to 
these groups may be large enough to make an important difference, 
Young cannot assume a universal audience. Nor can she escape the 
dilemma that faces all postmodernists who want to be politically per-
suasive. On the one hand, she cannot, as a postmodernist, present her 
values as fundamental, but must instead construe them as part of her 
own politics. On the other hand, if she wants to change people's 
minds, she needs to be able to persuade those who do not agree with 
her politics to take them seriously. 
While persuasiveness of this sort is not out of the question for 
postmodernists, they must be able to accomplish two tasks which 
purely philosophical postmodernists such as Lyotard and Rorty did 
not themselves have to recognize. The first is to find a way of genera-
lizing about the oppression experienced by members of a particular 
community that can be shared by others not in the group. The second 
is to accommodate political judgment within their postmodernism it-
self. While both tasks are formidable, neither is unrealizable. More-
over, as I have suggested above, by shifting our attention away from 
philosophy towards politics, Young, Nicholson, Fraser, and other 
postmodern feminists have already moved us closer to success in their 
valuable contributions to postmodern political thought. 
